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I.   INTRODUCTION 
If we feel confident in criticizing art for being sentimental, we ought to be able to 
precisely state how and why sentimentality is an aesthetic fault. This entails 
demonstrating that sentimental art fails to perform some function that is essential to 
art. In this paper I will argue that any critique of sentimental art that does not satisfy 
such a condition is not a legitimate aesthetic critique. Additionally I will put forth a 
genuinely aesthetic critique of sentimental art, establishing why sentimentality is an 
aesthetic fault and why art will be aesthetically flawed to the extent that it is 
sentimental.  
     Sentimentality is an ambiguous concept and my first step will be to crystallize 
working definitions of sentimentality and of sentimental art. Sentimentality will be 
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defined as an emotional disposition that idealizes its object for the sake of emotional 
gratification and that is inherently corrupt because it is grounded in epistemic and 
moral error. Sentimental art will be defined as art that, whether or not by design, 
evokes a sentimental response. Various critiques of sentimentality—as a general 
emotional disposition—are focused on its epistemic and moral shortcomings. 
However, I will argue, the critique of sentimental art for epistemic and moral reasons 
is not clear-cut because of the incongruity between our epistemic and moral 
expectation of art and of real-life. As the focal point of this discussion I will use the 
Socialist Realist painting Roses for Stalin by Boris Vladimirsky, which I take to be an 
exceptional example of sentimental art.  
     In the final section of the paper I propose my own aesthetic criticism of 
sentimentality. I will show that the moral and epistemic defectiveness of 
sentimentality does prove aesthetically detrimental to sentimental art. My argument 
draws on Noël Carroll’s “clarificationist” thesis, by which he suggests a way of 
conceiving of the relationship between art and moral understanding. Carroll contends 
that an important function of narrative (and, I add, figurative) art, is its ability to 
clarify and reorganize our moral attitudes by engaging our morally grounded 
emotions. Clearly, the fact that sentimental art appeals to sentimental emotions (i.e. 
emotions that are not based on sound moral or epistemic judgments) effectively 
undercuts the possibility of its providing moral clarification.  
     I argue that in the case of works like Roses for Stalin—that present themselves 
precisely as morally significant artworks—their sentimentality is tantamount to their 
aesthetic failure. This is because the aesthetic value of such works is meant to derive 
from their power to evoke morally “clarifying” emotional experiences of the type that 
Carroll describes. However, not all sentimental artworks are the complete aesthetic 
failures that Roses for Stalin is. Sentimental artworks, even if they do not purport to 
moral seriousness, are nevertheless aesthetically flawed because in being sentimental 
they offer exactly the opposite of moral clarification. I argue that if facilitating moral 
clarification is an aesthetic virtue it follows that encouraging the indulgence of 
sentimental emotions is a fault. Thus, any artwork will be aesthetically flawed, at least 
to some extent, insofar as it is sentimental. 
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II.  SENTIMENTALITY AND SENTIMENTAL ART 
There is a philosophical debate over the exact nature of sentimentality. On one side 
are those who maintain that sentimentality can be identified with a distinct set of 
characteristically sweet and innocuous emotions. Mark Jefferson defines 
sentimentality by its “emphasis upon such things as the sweetness, dearness, littleness, 
blamelessness, and vulnerability of the emotion’s objects.”1 On the other side are 
those who believe that sentimental emotions can be of many kinds. Among these is 
Anthony Savile, who contends that all standard feelings (e.g. grief, pity, love) can be 
sentimental if they are “felt and entertained in a particular way.”2  
     In this paper I will adopt the latter view. There are two reasons for this: First, I do 
not accept that the only kind of emotional engagement we might have with sweet, 
vulnerable or cute objects is a sentimental one. Secondly, these objects are by no 
means exhaustive of what can be given a sentimental treatment. For example, the film 
Rocky sentimentalizes the lead character’s scrappy underdog spirit. War memorials 
sentimentalize nationalism and the glory of battle. A suitable definition of 
sentimentality would have to account for examples such as these. 
     Sentimental emotions differ from standard emotions in an important way. Savile 
and others (most notably David Pugmire) take sentimental emotions to be corrupted 
versions of their standard counterparts, arguing that sentimentality is by definition a 
type of defect. To understand this position it is necessary to recognize that it 
presupposes a judgment theory of emotion. A judgment theory of emotion holds that 
all emotions have intentional objects and are rooted in a subject’s beliefs and 
judgments about the object. Accordingly, different emotions are defined by the type of 
object they have and the judgments or beliefs held by a subject with respect to this 
object. Thus, to borrow Robert Solomon’s examples, the intentional object of anger is 
a responsible agent who one judges to have committed an offense against oneself.3 On 
the other hand the intentional object of indignation is an individual who is thought to 
have transgressed a moral principle and it entails the subject’s judgment of her own 
moral superiority.4 Accordingly, describing an emotional response as appropriate 
means recognizing that it genuinely stems from a sound judgment about its object. 
                                               
1
   Jefferson (1983), p. 526. 
2
   Savile (2002), p. 315. 
3
   Solomon (1993), p. 228. 
4
   Solomon (1993), p. 270-1. 
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     Sentimental emotions are defective because they are not rooted in sound emotional 
reasoning. When we take a sentimental view of Rocky Balboa’s gritty rise from wash-
up to championship contender, we overlook the extreme improbability of the event in 
order to preserve the good feelings it rouses. A war memorial is sentimental when it is 
designed with a particular response in mind (e.g. admiration, pride) if this response 
overlooks or contradicts the true facts of the event it memorializes. In both cases these 
sentimental feelings require us to hold distorted views of the objects we 
sentimentalize. The distorted view is adopted and maintained for the sake of the 
emotion, which—for whatever reason—is thought desirable in itself. Savile stresses 
that this misrepresentation usually involves an idealized view of an object “under the 
guidance of a desire for gratification and reassurance.”5 Of great significance is the 
fact that in holding fast to these idealized views we adopt a method of emotional 
reasoning that upsets the causal priority of judgment and belief over emotion. This 
makes sentimental emotions corrupt on a most basic level. 
     Sentimental art is art that provokes a sentimental response.6 It is often—but not 
necessarily—designed for this purpose. It follows from our definition of sentimentality 
that if an artwork prompts a sentimental response it must do so by presenting its 
subject in a manner that is conducive of such a response—i.e. an idealized and 
distorted view. Roses for Stalin is a sentimental artwork. This work is sentimental 
because the manner in which it represents Stalin is intended to support a very specific 
and unambiguous set of emotions. This representation is designed for this purpose and 
Stalin would have been depicted in a manner conducive of this end regardless of what 
Stalin was, in reality, actually like. Representational fidelity is not the goal of this 
painting. One may see many aesthetic flaws in the painting. It might appear 
compositionally simplistic, or its symbolism may seem heavy-handed. These are 
legitimate aesthetic criticisms of the work, but neither one directly addresses the fact 
of the work’s sentimentality. These flaws may be consequences of the works 
sentimentality—Vladimirsky probably made these choices so as to avoid any 
interpretational ambiguity—however, they are not necessary consequences of its 
sentimentality. It would have been possible for the work to have been more 
sophisticated and still sentimental.  
                                               
5
   Savile (2002), p. 316. 
6
  My discussion of sentimental art will cover only representational artworks. This is because the 
definition of sentimentality used in this discussion cannot coherently be applied to non-representational 
works. 
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     The aim of this discussion is to determine whether or not sentimentality itself is an 
aesthetic fault. As a corruption of the process of sound emotional reasoning, 
philosophers criticize sentimentality on epistemic and moral grounds. These criticisms 
are not necessarily focused on art, as sentimentality can be a feature of many aspects 
of life, e.g. greeting cards, political conventions, ticker-tape parades, graduation 
ceremonies, news reporting.7 These criticisms do not become legitimate aesthetic 
criticism simply by virtue of being focused on an artwork. Roses for Stalin may be 
epistemically and morally corrupt, but does this make it bad art? In the following 
section I will consider these criticisms and determine why they cannot legitimately 
serve as aesthetic criticisms.  
 
III.  THE EPISTEMIC AND MORAL CRITIQUES OF SENTIMENTALITY 
Savile writes: “There is always something wrong with [sentimentality]…there are no 
situations the proper perception of which demands a sentimental response”.8 The 
essence of Savile’s criticism is epistemic. Judgments that are based on a sentimental 
disposition towards their objects are epistemically compromised because 
sentimentality consists of active misrepresentation of the world through falsity and 
lack of evidential justification.9 Wherever honesty, accuracy and truth are prized a 
sentimental disposition will be inappropriate.  
     However, we do not have these epistemic expectations of art. Woody Allen’s 
Manhattan and Fellini’s Roma are very selective, idealized and idiosyncratic 
representations of their respective namesakes and this is not regarded as a deficiency 
of either work. Artistic representations, such as these, that manifest a well defined 
point-of-view—and consequently prescribe a particular emotional response—are 
aesthetically enriched rather than marred by this. Leveling an epistemic criticism 
against either film for failing in its responsibility to faithfully document the city would 
be misunderstanding the artists’—artistically legitimate—motivations for making the 
films. There is no question that sentimental art misrepresents its subject and is 
therefore epistemically deficient. However, it cannot be this deficiency that is pointed 
to as its key aesthetic flaw. 
                                               
7
   Neill and Ridley (2002), p. 313. 
8
  Savile (2002), p. 315. 
9
  Savile (2002), pp. 316-17. 
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     Roses for Stalin is anomalous, even among sentimental artworks, because the 
judgments it urges us to accept are so outrageous. Stalin’s identity as a historical 
figure so sharply contradicts how he is represented in the painting that it renders this 
depiction preposterous, if not offensive. This is such an obtrusive and distracting 
feature of the work that it cancels out the possibility of any serious aesthetic 
engagement with it. Most significantly this undermines the painting’s affective 
power—a savvy viewer cannot partake of the warm feelings it is meant to inspire. 
Insofar as this feeling is central to the design and meaning of the work, this falsity 
amounts to its aesthetic failure.  
     However, this does not provide a epistemic ground for the aesthetic critique of 
sentimentality. Possibly in the context in which this work first appeared it was not as 
transparent as it is to a contemporary audience. Thus, it may have possessed the 
affective power it was intended to and was not an aesthetic failure in the manner 
described. It was nevertheless sentimental and presumably aesthetically flawed to the 
degree that it was. A satisfactory aesthetic critique of sentimentality would have to 
account for this. 
     The moral critique of sentimentality is most extensively developed by David 
Pugmire, who claims that sentimentality is immoral because it is dishonest. Pugmire 
argues that in sentimentalizing we are deliberately entertaining a distorted perception 
of an object for the sake of a desired emotional experience, and we may very well be 
privy and indifferent to the fact that we are doing so. Moreover, sentimental emotions 
lack the psychological commitments of standard emotions. Therefore, in indulging 
these emotions we are also being dishonest about our own emotional state.10 
Sentimental dishonesty consists in misplacing emotion “not through confusion or 
mere ignorance but through an indulgent and even insistent disregard for its 
misplacement.”11  
     It would be gratuitously naïve to take Roses for Stalin to be an exception to this, 
and take the falsity that it propagates to be a consequence of Vladimirsky’s 
unintentional misunderstanding of his subject matter. Roses for Stalin serves well as 
an example of profane, immoral sentimentality because insofar as the work is 
successful in creating positive feelings about its subject it distracts from his overriding 
negative qualities. Moreover, it was designed for this very purpose, as was most 
                                               
10
   Pugmire (2005), p. 128. 
11
   Pugmire (2005), p. 127. 
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Stalin-era Soviet art, and was meant to conceal the actual failures and misdeeds of 
political leadership. The moral condemnation of Roses for Stalin in this context—as a 
tool for the dissemination of mendacious propaganda—is certainly justified. However, 
it does not necessarily follow from this that the work is aesthetically flawed. In order 
to show that it is aesthetically flawed it must be shown that by virtue of its 
sentimentality it does not or cannot fulfil some function that is essential to art. It is far 
too controversial to take for granted that being morally good is one of these.  
     To summarize, sentimental art evokes a desired emotional response by idealizing 
its subject, thereby obscuring factual and moral truths about it. It is a response that is 
based on corrupt emotional reasoning and that lacks the psychological commitments 
of genuine emotions. Establishing that these features of sentimental art compromise it 
aesthetically requires showing the following:  
 
(1) That art should be expected to reveal factual and moral truths about its subject,  
(2) An essential function of at least some art is to engage us in sound emotional 
responses that are properly related to our moral and epistemic judgements.  
 
In the following section I will argue that both of these are true. In doing so I will make 
use of Noël Carroll’s “clarificationist” criteria for making moral evaluations of 
narrative art. This points us towards what is really wrong with sentimental art. 
 
IV.  SENTIMENTALITY AND MORAL CLARIFICATION 
Carroll argues that it is possible to make moral assessments of narrative art and 
situates his position in opposition to autonomism. Autonomism holds that moral 
evaluations of art are inappropriate and possibly unintelligible because art is 
completely removed from the real-life circumstances within which moral evaluations 
apply.12 Carroll argues that it is not possible to separate art and life to the extent 
desired by autonomists because real world knowledge is required to understand most 
narrative artworks.13  
     An effective narrative, Carroll writes, is written with selectivity. It is impossible 
for a narrative to report every detail of the situation and characters it depicts. Thus, 
narratives are organized as a series of cues by which the audience references its own 
                                               
12
   Carroll (1998), p. 134. 
13
   Carroll (1998), p. 135. 
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knowledge and beliefs.14 It is necessary to apply our knowledge of real world facts in 
understanding the text as well as our deductive and moral reasoning and language 
skills. Although Carroll limits his discussion to narrative art forms, there is a parallel 
case to be made for figurative artworks, like Roses for Stalin. One cannot understand 
Roses for Stalin if one does not recognize Stalin, recognize the children as young 
pioneers, and understand the significance of Stalin’s persona for communist party 
ideology. A necessary condition of understanding the meaning of this painting is a 
familiarity with the real life counterparts of the represented objects. 
     Carroll argues that understanding narratives also requires having appropriate 
feelings towards what is represented. Thus, our understanding of narrative requires 
that we have the beliefs required to support these feelings. For example, 
understanding Schindler’s List requires feeling admiration for what Schindler is 
doing, thus believing that the Nazis and their project are evil.15 Carroll contends that 
narratives do not introduce new moral beliefs but rather function by assuming that an 
audience shares a moral framework that they will reference according to the cues the 
work provides. Nonetheless, narratives can be educating because they can illuminate 
and clarify the moral beliefs that we have: they can reveal to us our moral and 
emotional investments and they give them resonance. He writes: “The narrative [is] an 
occasion for clarifying our emotions or, as Aristotle might put it, of learning to apply 
the right emotion to the appropriate objects with suitable intensity.”16  
     The essence of the clarificationist position is that we understand and aesthetically 
appreciate morally heady artworks by undergoing this kind of illumination or 
reorganization of our values. The impact of these works lies in their ability to give us 
this experience, and having this experience is the reason we value these kinds of 
artworks. Carroll writes: 
 
On the clarificationist view, learning from a narrative artwork through the 
enlargement or expansion of one’s moral understanding is not well described as a 
consequence of engaging with the story. Understanding the work, enlarging one’s 
moral understanding, and learning from the narrative are all part and parcel of the 
same process, which might be called comprehending or following the narrative.17 
                                               
14
   Carroll (1998), p. 138. 
15
   Carroll (1998), p. 140. 
16
   Carroll (1998), p. 144. 
17
   Carroll (1998), p. 145. 
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Sentimental art, which is designed to bring about a type of emotional response that is 
not grounded in sound epistemic and moral judgments about the world, cannot 
provide moral clarification. Sentimental art is designed to manipulate our emotional 
responses, and not only distract us from the moral and factual realities of which we 
ought to be mindful, but obscure the relationships that ought to inhere between our 
emotions and our beliefs and judgments. If we take the clarificationist position 
seriously it appears that this deficiency is a genuine aesthetic fault.  
     However, it cannot simply be the fact that sentimental art fails to bring about moral 
clarification that explains its aesthetic deficiency. There are countless artworks that 
have no moral content at all; these works are similarly lacking in this respect and we 
do not count this against them. Sentimental art is aesthetically flawed not because it is 
morally vacuous but because it is morally misleading. I contend that this is true of all 
sentimental art but it proves more aesthetically detrimental in some cases than others.  
What makes Roses for Stalin especially objectionable is the fact that it ostensibly 
derives its aesthetic power from its moral authority. The artwork is designed to 
impress upon us the virtues of the Soviet social and political order as symbolized by 
the powerful, father-like figure of Stalin and the humility and gratitude of the young 
pioneers who offer him flowers. We are meant to assent to and admire the rightness of 
this vision, our commitment to it being thereby made emotionally explicit. 
Correspondingly, the aesthetic merit of the work is meant to arise from its providing 
this type of experience—i.e. being a source of moral clarification. To the degree that 
the work purports to be a source of moral clarification its sentimentality results in its 
aesthetic failure. The work leads us to believe that veneration of Stalin’s persona is 
identical to authentic political conviction, thus providing an emotionally superficial 
experience that is misleading and falls short of Aristotle’s criteria on all three counts: 
it evokes emotions that are groundless, and directed towards an illegitimate object 
with inappropriate intensity. In so doing it fails to fulfil its chief task qua artwork. 
     However, it is not fair to conclude that sentimentality always precipitates complete 
aesthetic failure.  There is no doubt that we genuinely enjoy some sentimental 
artworks—like Rocky—despite recognizing their sentimentality. I think this is because 
these works do not purport to moral seriousness and we do not expect this of them. 
Additionally, we may find other sources of aesthetic enjoyment in these works that 
override their sentimentality. Nevertheless, every sentimental artwork is equally guilty 
of confounding and obscuring our genuine moral commitments for the sake of 
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producing emotional gratification. Rocky exploits our admiration for courage, hard-
work and kind-heartedness. Its depiction of these themes is sentimental because it is 
based on the equivocation of these virtues with the protagonist’s rise from debt-
collecting goon to national hero. While this is certainly a satisfying outcome it is one 
that greatly simplifies and misconstrues what is truly admirable about these virtues. 
The response the work is meant to evoke is grounded in unsound emotional reasoning 
and confuses, rather than clarifies, our moral commitments. To the degree that moral 
clarification is an aesthetically admirable quality this moral obfuscation is an aesthetic 
shortcoming. In this case as in others, sentimentality proves to be an aesthetic fault. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The goal of this paper was to establish how and why sentimentality is an aesthetic 
fault. As an alternative to the straight-forward moral and epistemic critique, I 
proposed Noël Carroll’s clarificationist thesis, according to which he argues that a 
valuable function of narrative (and, I insist, figurative) art is its ability to elucidate our 
moral commitments. I maintained that this was the most cogent basis for the aesthetic 
critique of sentimentality. From this it followed that the moral obfuscation 
characteristic of sentimental art is an aesthetic fault. Moreover, I argued that artworks 
that purport to moral seriousness—offering a corrupted emotional experience in the 
guise of moral improvement—are thereby most aesthetically damaged by their 
sentimentality. This is what makes Roses for Stalin especially bad among sentimental 
artworks; its sentimentality constitutes its complete aesthetic failure. 
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